

GERMANY

(Appendix Tables 323-333)

ARMISTICE PERIOD

FOOD CONDITIONS IN 1919

In December, 1918, Mr. Hoover asked the Germans for a complete statement of their food situation as a preliminary to the furnishing of any supplies. A special commission was appointed by the Germans, which submitted a detailed report in January, 1919, showing their supplies for the three crop years 1916, 1917, and 1918, together with much other relevant data.

After the receipt of this report, Mr. Hoover sent a mission consisting of Dr. A. E. Taylor and Dr. Vernon Kellogg to Berlin and elsewhere in Germany to study the conditions and to determine as far as possible the accuracy of the data submitted. The results of this investigation showed that apparently the Germans had placed all their cards on the table, and that the statement of their requirements was approximately correct.

It is of interest to note that, in explaining certain discrepancies between the crop figures submitted and the official war-period returns for previous years, the Germans stated that the earlier crop returns had been systematically increased from 10 to 20 per cent to make it appear that Germany was self-supporting.

The data which were made available showed very clearly how great a part the food situation had played in the collapse of the German military régime. In the light of these figures it appears that the slogan, "Food will win the war," was not so far from the truth.

The accompanying table gives the approximate production of cereals in Germany for the years 1913 to 1918, inclusive. This shows that the total cereal production decreased from over 30,000,000 metric tons in 1913 to only 15,000,000 in 1917 and 16,500,000 in 1918. The average pre-war consumption of these four cereals in Germany was approximately 32,500,000 tons, of which on the average about 4,500,000 tons were

imported.¹ The principal import was barley, used for brewing purposes.

APPROXIMATE PRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CEREALS IN GERMANY


	<i>(Thousand Metric Tons)</i>					
	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Wheat	4,656	3,972	3,886	3,288	2,386	2,590
Rye	12,222	10,427	9,152	9,109	6,591	7,447
Barley	3,673	3,138	2,484	2,797	2,003	2,085
Oats	9,714	9,038	5,986	7,696	4,038	4,459
Total	30,265	26,575	21,508	22,890	15,018	16,581

The pre-war consumption of bread grains (wheat and rye), including seed and those for industrial uses, was, according to German figures, approximately 16,850,000 tons. Of this amount, the average net imports supplied about 1,150,000 tons. Thus, on this showing Germany normally produced about 93 per cent of her required bread grains.

For the three years 1916, 1917, and 1918, the total production of wheat and rye was only 30,500,000 tons, or an average of 10,200,000 tons per year. This was only 60 per cent of her pre-war consumption. After deducting seed and the absolutely necessary industrial requirements, which would amount to approximately 2,000,000 tons, there were on the average only about 8,200,000 tons available for food. Calculating a ration of 12 kilograms per month for 70,000,000 persons would require for bread alone more than 10,000,000 tons.

During 1917-1918 and 1918-1919 the ration was reduced far below 12 kilograms per month. In 1918-1919 the rations may be taken as follows: for "self-producers," 9 kilograms of grain per month, while the regular ration for persons entitled to receive supplies was 260 grams of flour per day milled to 94 per cent extraction, equivalent to about 8½ kilograms of grain per month. From the data submitted by the Germans it is possible to determine the approxi-

¹ The 1913 crop was considerably above the average.



Map of Germany showing headquarters of American Friends Service Committee for cities in which feeding operations were organized, by districts.

mate requirements for the year 1918-1919 as follows:

APPROXIMATE BREAD-GRAIN REQUIREMENT IN GERMANY FOR THE CROP YEAR BEGINNING AUGUST 15, 1918	
	Metric Tons
16,000,000 self-producers at 9 kilograms per month	1,728,000
49,000,000 persons rationed at 8½ kilograms per month	4,900,000
Seed	1,400,000
Army and navy	1,000,000
Additional rations for heavy workers and other industrial classes	1,200,000
Industrial uses, dealers' stocks, and illicit trading	500,000
Total	10,728,000
Crop, less amount used previous to August 15, 1918	9,520,000
Deficit	1,208,000

On this calculation, which represents almost the minimum requirement, Germany had a deficit of 1,208,000 tons of bread grains. The Germans argued that their people had been undernourished for so long that they should be given an increased ration. If the ration were to be raised to 12 kilograms per month after January, another million tons would be required. It was on this basis that they asked for 400,000 tons of breadstuffs per month, or a total of 2,400,000 tons. In view of the world food situation and the needs of the Allies and the liberated territories it was impossible to meet this demand and, consequently, this sort of ration had to be refused.

The Germans were worse off in regard to their supply of meats, and particularly of fats, than of cereals. Chart VIII, copied from a diagram submitted with the report of the Germans to Mr. Hoover, shows a comparison of the civilian rations in 1917-1918 with the consumption in 1912-1913.


Expressed in another way, the 1917-1918 ration shows the following percentages of the pre-war consumption:

	Percent- age
Cereal products	64
Meats	18
Fats	12

Thus, while the consumption of cereals was only 36 per cent less than normal, the consump-

tion of fats was reduced by 88 per cent. This reduction in fat consumption was due largely to the decline in the number of hogs and to the lack of imports. With the exception of hogs, Germany's supply of animals did not decrease as much during the war as might be expected.

CHART VIII
PER CAPITA YEARLY CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTANT FOODS IN GERMANY 1912-13 AND 1917-18



The decrease in the number of cattle in 1918 compared with 1913 was only a little over 11 per cent, but for swine the decrease was nearly 58 per cent, or if we take the low point in the hog supply in March, 1918, the decrease was almost 80 per cent of the pre-war number.

A comparison of the number of animals does not, however, give a true picture of the possible supply of meats and fats. The shortage in feeding stuffs (particularly concentrated feeds) had seriously reduced the weight per head. The following table, compiled from the report of the Germans, shows the extent of this reduction in the dressed weight per head.

	Average Pre-War Weight in Kilograms	Average Weight in Kilograms for First 9 Months of 1918	Percentage Decrease
Cattle	250	137	45
Calves	40	29	27
Swine	85	55	35
Sheep	22	17	22

Naturally, this decrease in weight per animal resulted in a very much greater decrease in the fat content.

The total pre-war annual consumption of all meats and animal fats in Germany may be taken as about 112 pounds per person, or say 3,300,000 metric tons. The imports of all meat products in 1912 were 440,000 metric tons, leaving for home production about 2,860,000 tons. The best estimate obtainable for the total annual meat production in Germany in 1918 and 1919 is less than 1,000,000 tons, or less than 33 per cent of their pre-war consumption.

Milk production also decreased, although the reduction in the number of milch cows was less than the reduction in other cattle. Between December, 1916, and December, 1918, the number of milch cows decreased from 9,502,000 to 8,782,000, a decrease of less than 8 per cent. But the lack of proper feed decreased the milk flow in very much greater proportion. In 1916 the average production per milch cow, per year, in Germany was 1,800 liters, or 475 gallons. In 1918 this had fallen to 1,300 liters, or 344 gallons, a decrease of about 28 per cent. On this basis the total milk production of the empire for the three years was as follows:

	Gallons
1916	4,130,000,000
1917	3,510,000,000
1918	3,010,000,000

The serious reduction in the food supply was evident in the appearance of the German population. It was estimated that the population as a whole was 20 per cent under weight, and travelers in Germany after the Armistice say that this reduction was very evident to the eye.


Of far more importance than this was the reported increase in the death-rate and the increasing prevalence of constitutional diseases. This, according to the post-Armistice report of the Germans, was due to the lack of sufficient and proper food. The figures which they submitted in support of these claims were indeed

startling. The increase in the death-rate and the decrease in births is shown strikingly by the figures for the city of Berlin between 1913 and 1917, as follows:

Year	Per 1,000 Population		Excess of	
	Births	Deaths	Births	Deaths
1913	19.6	13.5	6.1	...
1914	18.5	14.6	3.9	...
1915	16.5	15.2	1.3	...
1916	12.6	15.1	...	2.5
1917	10.1	19.6	...	9.5

Chart IX, copied from the German report, shows the absolute figures for births and deaths in Berlin for each year since 1913.

CHART IX
BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN THE CITY OF BERLIN




The death-rate was highest in young children and in persons over sixty years of age. The death-rate in 1918 was even greater than in 1917, largely because of the influenza epidemic. In December, 1918, it was stated that on the average over 800 persons were dying daily in Germany because of undernourishment and the diseases resulting therefrom.

The chief cause of the increased death-rate, according to the German physicians, was the lowered resistance against infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis, caused by insufficient and improper food. Other causes were diseases of the alimentary canal, and such diseases as oedema, caused particularly by the lack of fats.

Chart X presents graphically some figures showing the increase in the death-rate from tuberculosis.

CHART X

TUBERCULOSIS DEATH RATE FOR 380 GERMAN CITIES OF OVER 15,000 INHABITANTS



THE ALLIED BLOCKADE

With a knowledge of these conditions Mr. Hoover urged the Allies to provide some arrangements by which Germany could secure the food she needed so badly.¹ Article XXVI of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918,² read as follows:

The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to re-

main liable to capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice as shall be found necessary.

By this article the Allied and Associated Powers expressed their conviction that it was impossible to establish peace with a section of Europe in serious want of food, even though this section contained a powerful enemy. Quite apart from its political aspects, modern civilization could not permit actual, preventable starvation to take place.

On the other hand, the Allies were equally convinced that it was the first duty of the world to see that the food supply was assured to the liberated and Allied territories. If there was any food left, the question of feeding Germany should then be considered.

No move was made toward the provisioning of Germany until the Armistice Convention at Treves, on January 16, 1919. At this convention the Armistice was extended from January 17 to February 17, 1919. The Associated Governments stated that it must be regarded as a condition precedent to the importation of food into Germany that the German mercantile shipping should be placed at the disposal of the Associated Powers. Article VIII of this Armistice extension³ stated that:

In order to secure the provisioning of Germany and of the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate. . . .

The Associated Powers also informed Germany at this convention that, in the first instance, they would permit the importation of 200,000 tons of breadstuffs, and 70,000 tons of pork per month in such manner and from such places as the Associated Governments might prescribe.

No movement was made by Germany toward placing her ships at the Allies' disposal and, consequently, no arrangements were made for the

¹ For a further discussion of Mr. Hoover's point of view, and of the steps taken by him at this time, see Frank M. Surface, *American Pork Production in the World War* (Chicago, A. W. Shaw Company, 1926), pp. 123-158; and Sidney Brooks, *America and Germany, 1918-1925*, Second Edition, revised (Macmillan Company, 1927), pages 144 ff.

² See H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920), I, 467-468.

³ *Loc. cit.*, pages 479-480.

shipment of food until the conference called at Spa on the sixth of February, 1919. At this conference it was arranged that the British authorities should supply certain foodstuffs to Germany, up to the value of 6,000,000 pounds sterling, this being the approximate value of 100,000,000 German gold marks and 25,000,000 gold francs, florins, and kroner which Germany agreed to deposit at the Nederlandsche Bank in Rotterdam for British credit. The quantities and prices of the foodstuffs to be furnished were 30,000 metric tons of pork products, at 180 pounds sterling per ton c.i.f. Rotterdam; 250,000 cases (4,763 metric tons) condensed milk, at 32 shillings per case c.i.f. Rotterdam; and such additional pork as the balance of the gold would buy.

The delivery of the first consignment of these commodities was delayed until the end of March, both because of Germany's reluctance to part with her ships and because of her delay in sending the gold to Rotterdam.

At the Spa Conference, Germany stated that her requirements for each month from March to August, 1919, inclusive, were 400,000 tons of wheat, 170,000 tons of maize, and 100,000 tons of fats and meats.

This quantity was far beyond the ability of the Allied Powers to supply from available stocks, or to transport with the available shipping. Germany was therefore told that she would have to get along with much smaller amounts. The maximum quantities which would be allowed were later fixed by the Brussels Agreement.

THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

Several other conferences were held with the German representatives, ending in the Brussels Conference of March 13 and 14, 1919. At this conference it was made clear to Germany that no food would be delivered to her until she had first complied with her agreement to turn over that part of her merchant fleet specified by the Naval Armistice Commission and, in addition, had deposited with the Director General of Relief sufficient gold to cover the value of the food.

Germany was very loathe to part with her merchant ships, inasmuch as she regarded these as her last card and was determined to secure all the advantages possible with them. But,

after having sidestepped the issue for over two months, she finally accepted the inevitable, signed the Brussels Agreement, began the delivery of her ships, and on March 22 made the first deposit of gold.

The following is the memorandum from the Supreme Economic Council¹ which was read at the Brussels Conference and which was accepted by Germany. All food deliveries to Germany during the Armistice Period were made under the terms of this Agreement:

MEMORANDUM OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL STATING THE INTENTIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS

1. The Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments. The Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighboring neutrals for the balance of the 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as the ships already named by the Germans as being ready have been sent to sea and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

2. She shall have the right to purchase and import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs or their equivalent in other human foodstuffs, and (70,000) tons of fats including Pork products, vegetable oils and condensed milk monthly until September 1st.

3. She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:—

(a) By export of commodities and the sale of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(b) By credits in neutral countries.

(c) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.

(d) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities or properties as collateral.

(e) By the hire of ships.

(f) Further gold also may be used as collateral for loans to be released as other means of payment provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above named means of payment are inadequate.

4. She may export commodities (except those that will be enumerated in a prohibited list) to any neutral or other approved destination. The proceeds from these exports must, however, be converted into payments for foodstuffs.

¹ Food Document 128 of Supreme Economic Council, Appendix II, Paris, 1919.

5. When the German ships are delivered, and subject to continuous performance by Germany of the whole of her obligations in relation to the subject matter of this memorandum the carriage of German supplies, up to the amount specified above for the period to 1st. September, will be a first charge upon their use.

6. She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities.

7. It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void, should Germany break the terms of the Armistice, or in any way fail to carry out her obligation as respects the delivery of her mercantile marine.

Food deliveries under the Brussels Agreement.—Under the terms of the Brussels Agreement, Germany was to be allowed to purchase and import food up to 300,000 tons of breadstuffs and 70,000 tons of fats, including milk, per month. In other words, the Allied blockade was raised to this extent. It was clear that such quantities could not be purchased by Germany without the assistance of the Associated Governments. Germany, however, had the right to refuse or accept any particular lot of food offered by the Allies or other nations.

In order to facilitate the operations with Germany, the Associated Governments established a commission at Rotterdam, known as the Rotterdam Food Commission. This Commission was charged particularly with seeing that Germany's purchase of food did not exceed the total monthly ration allowed to her, and also to facilitate commercial transactions in foods between Germany and the outside world.

The Germans appointed a delegate to work with the Rotterdam Commission. This delegate was empowered to accept or refuse particular lots of food offered for sale to Germany.

Under the terms of the Brussels Agreement, Germany was to pay for all food purchased from the Allies by deposits of gold in banks in Allied or neutral countries, which were to be placed to the credit of the Director General of Relief. This gold was to be used as collateral and Germany was to be given the opportunity to repurchase it from the proceeds of exports or the sale of securities. Under the original agreement, 125,000,000 gold marks were to be sent to the Nederlandsche Bank in Rotterdam for British credit, and 220,000,000 gold marks

deposited at the Banque Nationale in Brussels for American credit. These amounts proved inadequate to cover the quantities needed, and from time to time further deposits of gold were required to cover the cost of food ordered.

The gold deposits were received as follows:

Date of Receipt 1919	British Account, Marks	American Account, Marks	Place Received
Mar. 22...	50,000,000	Rotterdam
Mar. 25...	50,000,000	Rotterdam
Mar. 26...	220,000,000	Brussels
Apr. 1...	25,000,000	Rotterdam
Apr. 15...	80,000,000*	70,000,000*	Brussels
May 21...	200,000,000	Amsterdam
June 4...	210,000,000	Amsterdam
June 11...	120,000,000	30,000,000	Amsterdam
Total	marks 325,000,000	730,000,000	
Equivalent in dollars	... \$77,187,500	\$173,645,000	

* This total of 150,000,000 marks was originally deposited for American credit, but 80,000,000 marks were later transferred to the British account.

In all, Germany deposited 1,055,000,000 gold marks, worth approximately \$250,000,000 to cover the value of food delivered by the A.R.A., the Commission for Relief in Belgium, and the British Government. An examination of the gold deposited showed that it was worth approximately 23.75 cents per mark. In spite of the fact that this was gold, it proved exceedingly difficult to realize American dollars for it. The gold deposited for American credit was finally sold to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York for dollar credit in New York. The cost of melting and distributing the gold meant a considerable reduction on the pure gold value.

Immediately on receipt of the first indication that the Germans would carry out their agreements, the Director General of Relief diverted to Hamburg the S.S. "West Carnifax," then afloat for relief purposes. This steamer carried a cargo of 6,626.7 tons of wheat flour and arrived in Hamburg on March 25, anticipating by one day the arrival of the first consignment of gold for American credit.

Immediately after the signing of the Brussels Agreement, the Associated Governments indicated the following amounts of food available, all of which were accepted by the Germans:

From the A.R.A. stocks, and near-by afloat:

Commodity	Metric Tons
Wheat flour	35,000
Cereal flour	14,000
Rye grain	25,000

From C.R.B. stocks:

Commodity	Metric Tons
Cereal flour	15,000
Rice	10,000
Peas and beans	15,000
Barreled beef	4,000
Lard substitute	1,000

From the British Government:

Commodity	Metric Tons
Bacon	30,000
Condensed milk	10,000
Vegetable oil	20,000
Margarine	2,000
Drippings	2,000
Rice	35,000
Rangoon beans	50,000
Oatmeal	15,000
Cereal flour	10,000

From the French Government:

Commodity	Metric Tons
Palm kernels*	50,000

* In addition to the palm kernels, which were estimated to contain 15,000 tons of palm kernel oil, smaller amounts of mandioca flour, codfish, etc., were available.

In addition, the A.R.A. indicated their willingness to load for May delivery 25,000 tons of cereal flour and 100,000 tons of rye grain, beans, and peas. As a matter of fact, this provisional program was changed several times because of the supplies available in the home markets.

Furthermore, Germany was allowed to purchase supplies in any markets she chose, up to the limits of the allowed ration per month, provided she could make satisfactory financial arrangements. Considerable quantities were purchased from the Netherlands and other near-by countries and, in addition, arrangements were made to purchase grain from Argentina.

Table 83 summarizes the total supplies furnished to Germany from the time of the Brussels Agreement to September, 1919. As shown by this table, 1,215,217.8 metric tons, valued at \$282,410,999.21, were delivered during the Armistice Period under the direction of the Director General of Relief. Of this total, 618,135.8 metric tons, worth \$158,109,448.21, were furnished by American organizations.

The deliveries by the A.R.A. amounted to 483,094.9 metric tons, for which Germany paid \$113,728,950.49. The detail of these deliveries

by steamers and the commodities carried on each is given in Table 324. The C.R.B. also made substantial deliveries to Germany, partly from surplus stocks in Antwerp, and partly by direct shipments from the United States. The total deliveries to Germany by the C.R.B. included 134,980.0 metric tons, for which they received cash from the proceeds of the German gold in the amount of \$44,350,810.47. The detail of these deliveries is given in Table 326. This operation made it possible to supply, immediately, fats which were so badly needed in Germany. The supplies from the C.R.B. were sold to Germany for the most part f.o.b. Antwerp and Rotterdam and were transported to German ports in their own ships.

The total deliveries from the United States in the Armistice Period may be summarized by commodities as follows:

DELIVERIES TO GERMANY FROM THE UNITED STATES
ARMISTICE PERIOD, 1919

Commodity	<i>(Metric Tons)</i>			Total
	American Relief Administration Cash Sales	Quakers	Commission for Relief in Belgium	
Flour	241,865.1	16,065.0	257,930.1
Grain	131,748.3	44,581.0	176,329.3
Rice	9,209.6	21,245.0	30,454.6
Beans and peas	42,200.0	19,567.0	61,767.0
Pork products	46,956.1	10.0	32,995.0	79,961.1
Milk	11,115.8	26.7	11,142.5
Cocoa	13.2	13.2
Miscellaneous food	527.0	527.0
Clothing and miscellaneous	11.0	11.0
Total	483,094.9	60.9	134,980.0	618,135.8

The A.R.A. made a further sale of 60.9 metric tons to the American Friends Service Committee (cf. page 117) which undertook to furnish benevolent relief to German children. This was used for supplementary meals to children under the direction of the Quaker personnel in much the same manner as the child feeding carried on by the A.R.A. in other countries. In a sense this was the forerunner of the extensive child-feeding operations under the Quakers in the Reconstruction Period as discussed below. The details of this sale are shown in Table 325. In the present report this is regarded as a sale by the A.R.A., but the American Friends Service Committee is given credit with a cash donation of this amount.

TABLE 83
SUMMARY OF TOTAL RELIEF DELIVERIES TO GERMANY
(For detail see Table 323)

Operation	Total Metric Tons	Total Value
Armistice Period		
American Relief Administration (cash sales).....	483,094.9	\$113,728,950.49
American Friends Service Committee.....	60.9	29,687.25
Commission for Relief in Belgium (cash sales).....	134,980.0	44,350,810.47
Total from United States.....	618,135.8	\$158,109,448.21
United Kingdom.....	299,144.0	\$ 75,653,861.00
France.....	69,404.0	16,262,889.00
Argentina.....	155,000.0	16,774,000.00
Netherlands.....	44,648.0	9,784,989.00
Switzerland.....	28,886.0	5,825,812.00
Total from countries other than United States.....	597,082.0	\$124,301,551.00
Total, Armistice Period.....	1,215,217.8	\$282,410,999.21
Reconstruction Period		
American Friends Service Committee.....	28,720.1	\$ 6,728,989.92
German Government donation.....	16,833.0	2,392,021.25
Total children's relief.....	45,553.1	\$ 9,121,011.17
American Relief Administration Warehouses, food drafts and bulk sales... E.C.F. (sundry sales, liquidation Hamburg warehouses).....	9,347.4 4,053.0	\$ 2,820,420.47 362,571.27
Total other than children's relief.....	13,400.4	\$ 3,182,991.74
Total, Reconstruction Period.....	58,953.5	\$ 12,304,002.91
Deduct duplication, bulk sales included in children's relief.....	1,237.2	341,309.37
Total net, Reconstruction Period.....	57,716.3	\$ 11,962,693.54
Grand total relief deliveries.....	1,272,934.1	\$294,373,692.75

DELIVERIES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

The total deliveries to Germany during the Armistice Period from countries other than the United States amounted to 597,082.0 metric tons, valued at \$124,301,551. Of this amount, the United Kingdom furnished 299,144.0 tons for a total of \$75,653,861. These deliveries were for the most part made from surplus stocks of food which Great Britain had accumulated during the latter period of the war, but which, with the rearrangement of her food supply, were not so readily disposed of in England. Part of the British deliveries were from Canada and Australia, and, in addition, approximately 100,000 tons of potatoes were from England. No detailed record of the shipment of these supplies was furnished to the Director General of Relief, but Table 327 shows the deliveries by months. All deliveries

to Germany by the United Kingdom were paid for in cash from the German deposits of gold.

The French Government undertook to deliver to Germany certain quantities of French Colonial products, consisting of 55,000 tons of palm kernels and 6,000 tons of pork and other fats. Smaller quantities of other Colonial products were also offered for sale. These supplies were not paid for by German gold, as in the case of the United States and England, but instead, German commodities, including iron ore and coal, were imported into France to cover their value. Table 83 shows the total deliveries from France as 69,404.0 metric tons, with a valuation of \$16,262,889. The only detail available regarding these transactions is the record of the deliveries, by months, as shown in Table 328.

Germany purchased small quantities of food from neighboring neutrals, such as Holland and

DELIVERIES TO GERMANY FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES
ARMISTICE PERIOD, 1919
(Metric Tons)

Commodity	United Kingdom	France	Argentina	The Netherlands	Switzerland	Total
Flour	21,045.0	1,402.0	22,447.0
Grain	135,000.0	135,000.0
Rice, beans, peas.....	37,658.0	37,658.0
Pork products	49,228.0	6,488.0	13,650.0	69,366.0
Milk	17,018.0	17,018.0
Miscellaneous food	145,699.0	6,514.0	24,695.0	28,886.0	205,794.0
Miscellaneous non-foods	28,496.0	55,000.0	20,000.0	6,303.0	109,799.0
Total	299,144.0	69,404.0	155,000.0	44,648.0	28,886.0	597,082.0

Switzerland. The chief supplies received from Holland were lard and potatoes. In May, Germany was able to contract for the purchase of 200,000 tons of wheat and linseed from Argentina. To take care of the transportation of these supplies the Freight Committee of the Supreme Economic Council allocated German tonnage to go to the Plate region. Up to September, 1919, Germany had received 135,000 tons of wheat and 20,000 tons of linseed from Argentina.

These supplies from neutral countries were financed by the surrender of German securities or by the sale of ships and cargoes in neutral ports, and therefore represent cash transactions.

The total deliveries from these countries are shown above, and available details are given in Table 329. The tabulation above summarizes deliveries to Germany during the Armistice Period from countries other than the United States.

The total supplies delivered to Germany in terms of breadstuffs and fats amounted to approximately 600,000 tons of the former and 175,000 tons of the latter. These deliveries cover a period of five months. Under the terms of the Brussels Agreement, Germany would have been allowed to import in five months 1,500,000 tons of cereals and 350,000 tons of fats. Her importations were thus far below the allowed ration. She did, however, purchase all that the world supply of food and shipping would permit and all for which she could provide finance.

There can be no question but that the delivery of these supplies to Germany saved that country from the fate of Russia. We have already pointed out that food conditions in Germany after the Armistice had reached a point where deaths resulting from starvation were of daily occurrence among the civilian population. No country could long resist bolshevism under such conditions. From the middle of February

and well into the month of March, Germany was staggering on the verge of this curse. It is significant that soon after the first food ship arrived the political situation made a decided change and, after that time, steadily improved.

If bolshevism had secured a position in the center of Europe it must have seriously threatened all other Western European countries, and it is only a step from the Eastern to the Western Hemisphere.

RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD

CHILDREN'S RELIEF

Reference has been made to the work in Germany by the American Friends Service Committee (cf. pages 117-20) and other Quaker organizations. This work was begun almost immediately after the Armistice. A survey made by the Friends at that time indicated that 75 per cent of the children in Germany were undernourished and in need of supplementary feeding. It was impossible to undertake much of this work during the Armistice Period, partly because the Allied Powers were unwilling to permit it and partly because public opinion in America and the Allied countries was not ready to approve of it. However, with the peace treaty definitely signed public opinion was no longer willing to see women and children suffer needlessly. As expressed by Mr. Hoover¹ in a memorable statement during the Armistice Period, when asked why we were feeding Germany:

From the point of view of my Western upbringing, I would say at once, because we do not kick a man in the stomach after we have licked him. . . .

¹ For complete statement see Sidney Brooks, *America and Germany*, Second Edition, revised (Macmillan, 1927), pages 73 ff.

From the point of view of a humanitarian, I would say that we have not been fighting with women and children and we are not beginning now. . . .

Taking it by and large, our face is forward, not backward on history. We and our children must live with these seventy millions of Germans. No matter how deeply we may feel at the present moment our vision must stretch over the next hundred years, and we must write now into history such acts as will stand creditably in the minds of our grandchildren.

In November, 1919, Mr. Hoover asked the A.F.S.C. to undertake the responsibility for German child-feeding and promised full co-operation from the E.C.F. An agreement was drawn up between the two organizations by which the E.C.F. undertook to attend to the purchasing and shipping of commodities required in the child-feeding work in Germany while the A.F.S.C. was to handle all details of distribution within the country. The funds for this work were provided from the proceeds of the European Relief Council drive, and from the nominal surplus derived from the food draft sales in Germany referred to below. The overhead expenses of the Quaker mission were paid out of other funds. In addition to this work by the American Friends, the British Quakers undertook similar work in the part of Germany occupied by the British Army. This was handled entirely by funds collected in Great Britain and by British personnel and is not included in this report.

The original mission from the A.F.S.C. was composed of fifteen volunteers who arrived in Germany in January, 1920. The first shipment of child-feeding supplies under these arrangements arrived in Hamburg on February 13, 1920 (Table 167), and child feeding was started on February 26. By the first of July, 1920, the Quakers were feeding 632,000 children from 3,392 feeding stations, in 88 German cities and districts. The number of children fed reached its peak a year later in June, 1921, when 1,026,856 were receiving the supplementary meal.

The methods employed by the Quakers were almost identical with those used in other countries by the E.C.F. One meal a day (excluding Sundays) was furnished to undernourished children, and to expectant and nursing mothers. Children over six were fed mostly in schools, while the younger children and mothers ob-

tained their meals at kindergartens or similar institutions. The details of cooking and distribution were handled chiefly by local German committees. In crowded localities the food was cooked in large central kitchens, and distributed to feeding centers in large thermos kettles. Thus, two kitchens in Berlin cooked for 35,000 and 25,000, respectively.

Children and mothers to be fed were selected in accordance with regulations prepared by an advisory committee of the leading child specialists in Germany. No distinction was made on account of race, religion, politics, or social position.

Very strict regulations were enforced by the Quakers requiring that all food furnished to each kitchen must be accounted for by the proper number of meals actually served as recorded by meal-ticket attendance. Weekly reports were rendered by each local committee.

The total supplies furnished to the Friends by the E.C.F. for German child feeding amounted to 28,720.1 metric tons, valued at \$6,728,989.92 (Tables 83 and 323). The detail of the arrival of these supplies in Germany and their delivery to the Friends Committee is shown in Tables 167 and 331. The records of the internal deliveries of these supplies are in the archives of the A.F.S.C. in the Haverford College Library at Haverford, Pennsylvania.

The map on page 190 shows the location of the district offices and the feeding stations maintained by the Quakers.

Co-operation of the German Government.—Throughout this work the German Government co-operated in a wholehearted manner with the A.F.S.C. A committee was formed, known as the German Central Committee for Foreign Relief (Deutscher Zentralaussschuss für die Auslandshilfe), headed by Dr. Bose of the German Food Ministry, which co-ordinated the work of all welfare organizations in Germany. The German Government made substantial contributions of commodities (flour and sugar) for the children's relief work to the extent of 16,833.0 metric tons, valued at \$2,392,021.25. In addition to these amounts, Germany also paid for the transportation, handling, and warehousing of all relief supplies, and through volunteer services for the cooking and distribution of the food. On the next page is a rough estimate of the total German contribution to this work.

GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO CHILD FEEDING

Transportation, warehousing, etc.	\$ 175,000.00
Volunteer services (30,000 workers)	2,375,000.00
	<hr/>
Total services	\$2,550,000.00
Commodity donations (Table 83)	2,392,021.25
	<hr/>
Total	\$4,942,021.25

The Friends withdrew from German child-feeding operations at the end of 1922, but, as previously related, they later returned to Germany to continue their child-feeding operations with funds raised through a committee headed by Major General Henry T. Allen. This work lies outside the scope of the present report. It should also be pointed out that in addition to the relief work discussed here the American Friends Service Committee and other Quaker organizations carried on a large amount of relief work in Germany, as well as elsewhere, entirely on their own responsibility, which we have not attempted to cover. For information regarding this the reader is referred to the publications of the A.F.S.C. and also to an interesting book by Ruth Fry,¹ which deals particularly with the work of the English Quakers.

FOOD DRAFTS AND BULK SALES

The food draft plan was inaugurated in 1920, as a means of supplying the people of Central Europe with food which their relatives and friends in America wished to provide. The large German population in the United States quickly availed themselves of this method of assisting their relatives in Germany. The sale of food drafts for delivery in Germany was the second largest in Central Europe, being exceeded only by the sale of drafts for Austria. As shown in Table 332, the number of food drafts for Germany was 142,873, representing 5,242.8 metric tons of food with a total value of \$2,096,410.

Extensive bulk sales of food were also made from the Hamburg warehouse for Germany. Table 333 shows that these sales amounted to 4,104.6 metric tons of food with a total value of \$724,010.47. These sales were made to various organizations in Germany, including local relief bodies, and also to certain commercial houses which undertook to resell the commodities at a nominal profit. Included in this amount are

¹ A. Ruth Fry, *A Quaker Adventure*, Nisbet and Company, London, 1926.

1,237.2 metric tons, valued at \$341,309.37, which were delivered to the A.F.S.C. for child feeding and represents the profits by the E.C.F. on the total food draft and bulk sale business in Germany. As pointed out in an earlier section (page 94), all profits from the warehouse operations were returned for child feeding in the countries in which these sales were made. The only way this could be done in Germany was to turn over commodities to the Quaker organization.

Table 83 shows that the total food draft and bulk sales operation in Germany amounted to 9,347.4 metric tons, valued at \$2,820,420.47. Inasmuch as the deliveries to the Quakers for child feeding discussed above are included in this and also in the Friends child-feeding operations, it has been necessary to deduct the bulk sale to the Quakers to obtain the figure for net deliveries to Germany (cf. Table 83 and Table 323).

Table 83 also shows an item of sundry sales for the liquidation of the stock in Hamburg warehouses. This represents the final closing of the Hamburg warehouses in the late summer of 1923. Hamburg had been used as a transshipping point for supplies going into Russia, since it was cheaper to unload trans-Atlantic steamers there and forward supplies by small ships than to direct the large steamers to the Baltic ports. After the completion of the Russian operations there were certain stocks of supplies remaining which could not be used in Russia, and since all other relief operations had ceased these stocks were sold for cash to German dealers. The total quantity sold was 4,053.0 metric tons (including some damaged commodities) for which the Administration received \$362,571.27.

The total net relief deliveries to Germany during the Reconstruction Period was 57,716.3 metric tons, valued at \$11,962,693.54. Adding this to the deliveries during the Armistice Period gives a grand total of all relief to Germany accounted for in this report of 1,272,934.1 metric tons with a total value of \$294,373,692.75. This may be summarized as follows:

Sold for cash	\$285,135,904.48
Benevolence	9,237,788.27
	<hr/>
Total	\$294,373,692.75

As pointed out above there were still other relief deliveries to Germany by the Quakers, the Red Cross, and other organizations which are not included in this report.